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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the performance of 361 non-financial public firms that are listed on Bursa Malaysia during a 
relatively tranquil period from 2002 until 2007. The objective is to identify the corporate finance and governance 
practices that contribute to firm performance. In this study, performance is measured using Tobin’s Q. The results 
from a fixed-effect panel data regression on 2,166 yearly-firm observations show four significant explanatory factors; 
leverage, dividend per share, CEO duality and Board size. The results imply that firms are more likely to perform if they 
employ more debt, pay higher dividend per share, hire different individuals to assume the two most important roles in 
the company and maintain a smaller number of directors. The four factors are then used to construct a model in which 
viability is proven if it can effectively differentiate the financial and governance characteristics of the high performers 
from the poor performers. The model seems more effective in predicting high performance, rather than low performance. 
High performance companies are therefore those that pay a much higher dividend per share and separate the roles of 
CEO and Board’s Chair. Debt ratio and Board size are less definitive in segregating the two groups of companies. 
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menganalisis prestasi 361 syarikat awam bukan kewangan yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia dalam satu 
tempoh ekonomi stabil dari tahun 2002 hingga 2007. Objektifnya adalah untuk mengenal pasti amalan kewangan dan 
tadbir urus korporat yang menyumbang kepada prestasi. Dalam kajian ini, prestasi syarikat diukur menggunakan 
nisbah Tobin Q. Hasil regresi data panel kesan tetap ke atas 2,166 cerapan tahunan-syarikat menunjukkan empat 
faktor penjelas adalah signifikan yakni leveraj, dividen se saham, dwi peranan CEO dan saiz Lembaga Pengarah. 
Hasil kajian menyarankan syarikat lebih berpeluang untuk meningkatkan prestasinya jika ia menggunakan lebih 
banyak hutang, membayar dividen se saham yang lebih tinggi, memastikan dua jawatan terpenting dalam syarikat 
dijawat oleh dua individu yang berbeza dan mengurangkan bilangan pengarah. Keempat-empat faktor yang signifikan 
tersebut seterusnya digunakan untuk membentuk satu model yang kemampuannya dibuktikan jika secara efektif ia 
mampu membezakan ciri-ciri kewangan dan tadbir urus syarikat berprestasi tinggi daripada yang berprestasi lemah. 
Model tersebut nyata lebih efektif untuk meramalkan prestasi tinggi berbanding rendah. Syarikat berprestasi tinggi 
jelas membayar dividen se saham yang jauh lebih tinggi dan mengasingkan jawatan CEO daripada Pengerusi Lembaga 
Pengarah. Nisbah hutang dan saiz Lembaga Pengarah kurang meyakinkan dalam membezakan antara dua kumpulan 
syarikat tersebut.
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INTRODUCTION
The primary responsibility of the management of 
corporations is to achieve the optimal level of financial 
performance and to update the stakeholders periodically 
about the status. To that extent, corporate performance 
largely depends on management behavior, which 
is multi-dimensional. Shaping the right managerial 
behavior that lead towards performance is, however, an 
impossible task because both humans and firms possess 
dynamic elements. Immense technological progress 
during the modern industrial era has inevitably brought 
about the leading changes in corporate culture, strategies 
and operations (Jensen 1993). Increasing competition 
among borderless corporations has raised standards of 
quality, growth and profitability. As a result, corporations 
are clouted from multidimensional forces, which include 
their own feeble internal control systems (Jensen 1986: 
2001). Violations, on theoretical grounds, of agency 
relationships, free cash flow, over-and-underinvestment, 
capital structure, and dividend policy have reshaped 
corporate behavior over the last few decades (Harris 
& Raviv 1991; Jensen 1986; Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Morgado & Pindado 2003; Naranjo, Nimalendran & 
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Ryngaert 1998). New measures need to be taken in order 
to identify what features are important in achieving the 
desired performance.
Firm performance is the result of an effective 
and efficient use of all components of a firm’s capital. 
External forces, such as changing regulations, advancing 
technologies, and state of competition, have influenced 
the growth and performance of firms. However, these 
factors are normally beyond the control of the firms 
themselves. Firms, however, maintain the authority, 
expertise and resources to make decisions on how to 
shape their internal forces. Of particular interest in this 
study are the major financial decisions and those who are 
responsible for the decisions. To a certain extent, the latter 
involves corporate governance, as it reflects the structure 
of the board of directors. Specifically, in regards to the 
CEO/chairperson role duality, board independence and 
board size are important in firm performance because 
they have a significant bearing on major decisions, 
particularly those involving the financing sources, cash 
disbursements and investments of the firms.   
In short, this study analyses the performance of 
Malaysian publicly listed firms with an objective to 
identify the combination of corporate financial and 
governance practices that impact corporate performance. 
To test the importance of these practices, they are 
composed into a model which, if proven viable, can be 
promoted as a future forecasting model. To form the 
model, the study focuses on important financial areas, 
including investment, dividend policy, capital structure 
and free cash flows. These financial areas are considered 
simultaneously with the three board governance 
variables, namely: CEO duality, board independence and 
board size. The viability of the index is verified by testing 
its ability to differentiate high performance companies 
from poor performance counterparts. 
The remaining discussion of the paper is organized 
as follows. The next section reviews past studies on 
major financial decisions and corporate governance. 
This is followed by a section that explains the data and 
methodology employed in the present study. The results 
and discussions are presented next, while the last section 
concludes the study and suggests the implications of the 
results. 
CORPORATE FINANCIAL AND GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES
The performance of financial managers, more often 
than not, is associated with their ability to efficiently 
raise the needed capital and invest the capital in projects 
that produce optimal returns for the firms. While those 
two decisions seem straight forward, the value creation 
effects could differ by the way the financing sources are 
mixed. That is the gist of the tax-correction paper by 
Modigliani-Miller (MM) in 1963, which is an advanced 
format of MM’s seminal contribution in capital structure 
theory (Modigliani & Miller 1958). While equity-based 
capital provides management with flexibility of not 
being pressured with periodical debt obligations and 
scrutiny by debt-holders, a new equity issuance has been 
perceived as sending bad signals to investors. Debt-
based capital offers interest tax-shields and additional 
monitoring, but too much debt can prove risky for the 
company’s long run survival. 
Normally, the motive behind debt issuance is to 
finance added-value activities. In the U.S., Fama and 
French (1999)  find that firms principally rely on long-
term debt for financing growth and seasonal variations; 
and on equity for mergers and acquisition activities. 
Regardless of the motives, the finding by Myers (1977) 
shows that the relationship between debt financing and 
corporate performance is negative, if applied under 
an underinvestment scenario. Similar to Myers, Lang 
et al. (1996) also discover that firms with a higher 
debt to asset ratio also experience negative corporate 
performance. However, such a relationship occurs 
when the investment decisions are of low quality. The 
significant negative relationship between debt ratio and 
performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) is also documented in 
Abor (2007). Other studies that examine the valuation 
effect of capital structure through the firm performance 
in product market (Campello 2006; Harris & Raviv 
1991) also find that valuation effect of debt is subject to 
the investment quality. These studies find that issuance of 
debt is positively associated with quality and reputation 
of firms. 
In their classic paper on capital structure, MM (1958) 
emphasize the importance of investment instead of 
capital structure to create firm’s value. However, past 
studies have also been mixed in documenting the impacts 
of investment increases on corporate performance. 
For instance, Myers (1977) put forwards a theory of 
underinvestment which posits that due to investor related 
policies, such as maintaining a high dividend payout 
ratios, managers do not invest enough because they are 
left with less funds to invest in good projects (Bebchuk 
& Stole 1993). On the contrary, possessing too much 
funds opens up opportunities for managers to overinvest, 
including in lower net present value (NPV) projects, which 
negatively influences corporate performance. Similarly, 
Chung et al. (1998) argue that corporate performance 
is positively influenced by the quality, rather than the 
quantity, of investment. Meanwhile, Baker et al. (2003) 
reveal that the impact of investment on firm performance 
depends on the method of financing (i.e. debt or equity) 
the investment. 
While the impacts of fund raising and investment 
activities on firms’ performance clearly indicates their 
importance, so do other financial policies that ensure 
the sustainability of those firms’ activities. For instance, 
firms’ dividend policies must be tailored toward pleasing 
their investors, whose reactions determine the firms’ 
value in the market and whose wealth is crucial for 
meeting firms’ future capital needs. The agency costs 
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argument; information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders; and the separation of ownership and 
control constitute the basic explanations as to why 
dividend policies matter. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
explain that abnormal returns following firms’ dividend 
announcement indicate that these firms are considering 
investing in quality projects. From another angle, a 
high dividend payout positively influences corporate 
performance because it reduces agency cost. 
As much as major financial decisions are important 
in creating value, equally important are the components 
of firms that ensure those decisions are efficiently 
materialized. The relevant component is corporate 
governance, which constitutes the combination of all 
corporate guidelines and responsibility frameworks 
(Gillan & Starks 1998). In Jensen’s (2001:9) words, 
corporate governance is critical because “without the 
clarity of mission provided by a single-value objective 
function, companies embracing stakeholder theory will 
experience managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency 
and perhaps even competitive failure”. Corporate 
governance works as an internal control system 
whose failure results in negative effects upon a firm’s 
performance, both in the product market as well as the 
capital market. Corporate governance mechanisms 
are relatively more important for firms in emerging 
markets to achieve comparative economic benefits. This 
is because the capital markets are still immature, since 
some are still undergoing massive corporatization, and 
the corporate reporting system is still lacking in regards to 
effectiveness (Chua, Eun & Lai 2007; Cremers & Ferrell 
2009). When incorporated in a study that recognizes the 
importance of financial decisions, attention should be 
paid to the governance of the board. As argued by John 
and Senbet’s (1998), the board is effectively at the center 
of corporate performance monitoring. 
The role of board governance has been studied in 
terms of its multiple dimensions, particularly the size of 
the board; the role of the duality of the CEO; and the level 
of independence of the Board. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2001) find that a small board is more effective, while 
large boards are more symbolic. Still, a larger board 
has its own advantages in overcoming environmental 
uncertainties (Pearce & Zahra 1992). Empirically, the 
evidence is more in favor of the effectiveness of smaller 
board size. Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
report a significant negative relationship between 
corporate performance (Tobin’s Q) and board size. The 
same significant negative relationship is also documented 
in Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) for the Malaysian market, 
although the relationship is occasionally insignificant 
(Holthausen & Larcker 1993). 
With respect to role of the duality of the CEO, Boyd 
(1995) reports it is significantly and positively related 
to corporate performance. On the contrary, Rhoades et 
al. (2000) find a deterioration in corporate value due 
to CEO duality. In other studies (c.f., Brickley et al. 
1997; Baliga et al. 1996) the relationships between CEO 
duality and corporate performance are insignificant. The 
insignificant relationship is also documented by Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) among Malaysian corporations. 
Another important aspect of board structure is board 
composition, which focuses on the level of independence 
in the directors’ decision making processes. Gompers et 
al. (2003) find a positive relationship between Tobin’s 
Q and democratic boards (presence of independent 
directors). Similarly, Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) find 
that corporations with more independent board members 
outperform their counterparts. On the contrary, Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) find a negative relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and board independence. In the Malaysian 
context, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find the impact of 
board composition on performance is also negative, but 
insignificant. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The sample firms of this study are selected from those 
listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. After August 
2009, the Main Board was merged with the Second Board 
and renamed as the Main Market. The other market is Ace 
Market, which replaced the former MESDAQ market. The 
time range of the data, from 2002 to 2007, is purposely 
chosen to ensure data availability on different indicators, 
especially regarding corporate governance variables 
such as board independence, CEO duality and board size. 
The financial data is mainly collected from DataStream 
database provided by Thomson Reuters, while data on 
the governance variables are manually collected from 
the annual reports of the companies. During our first 
screening test, based on data availability, 367 companies 
were selected. The number includes companies with 
missing data, which are then treated by obtaining the 
data from the annual reports. After a critical check on 
the data, another six companies were dropped due to 
extreme outliers in certain years. Finally, a balanced 
panel data of 361 companies, possessing six years of data 
from 2002 to 2007 was finalized. The results from the 
initial use of 367 companies, compared with later use of 
361 companies, did not reveal a significant difference, 
therefore, left no issue regarding survivorship bias. Table 
1 presents the distribution of the final sample firms by 
sector. The sample firms are representative of all main 
sectors in Malaysia except for the Bank and Financial 
Institutions sector, which is purposely excluded due to 
structural, listing and other regulatory differences.
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With panel data, this study enjoys the benefits of 
examining the listed companies in terms of both cross 
section and time series components. In panel data, 
researcher can control for individual fixed effects, which 
is common to any cross section across time, but may 
vary across a cross section during certain time periods. 
Panel data is popular in developing countries, where 
cross section data is often more available than data with 
long history (Gujarati 2003). Fixed-effect panel data 
models have constant slopes, but different intercepts for 
cross sectional units. The viability of using a fixed effect 
model or a random effect model can be decided using 
the Hausman test. The null hypothesis of the Hausman 
test is Ho: Random effects are consistent and efficient. 
The Hausman statistics may be viewed as a measure of 
distance between random and fixed effects. Hausman 
test follows a Chi Square distribution with ‘k’ degrees 
of freedom, where ‘k’ is the number of independent 
regressors (Ahn & Moon 2001). If the analysis rejects 
the null hypothesis, it is therefore more appropriate to 
run the fixed effect model for this data set. Fixed effect 
models are also appropriate when considering a specific 
set of ‘N’ firms and the inference is restricted to the 
behavior of these firms (Baltagi 2005). Random effects 
are chosen when some firms are randomly selected from 
a large pool of companies.
TABLE 1. Industry concentration of the selected companies
Sector 
Sample Firms
Number Percentage
Construction 26 7.20
Consumer Products 50 13.85
Hotels 6 1.66
Industrial Products 96 26.59
Infrastructure Project Companies 5 1.39
Plantation 31 8.59
Property 60 16.62
Technology 12 3.32
Trading/Services 75 20.78
TOTAL 361 100%
TABLE 2. Variables and the operational definitions
Variables Acronym Operational Definition 
Tobin’s Q TOBINQ Ratio of the market value of common shares plus book value of total debt divided by the 
book value of total assets.
Investment 
Growth INV
Growth in investment calculated by deducting the natural log of total assets at year t = 1 from 
year t = 0. 
Free Cash Flow FCF The ratio of the free cash flow to book value of total asset. Free cash flow is calculated by adding EBIT and Depreciation and by subtracting interest, tax and dividend payments. 
Capital Structure TDTA The ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total asset. 
Dividend Policy DPS The ratio of total dividend payment to total number of shares outstanding. 
CEO Duality BDUAL A dichotomous variable which takes a value of ‘1’ if the CEO also serves as the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, and ‘0’ otherwise.
Board 
Independence BIND The ratio of the number of independent directors to total number of directors. 
Board Size BSIZE Natural log of the total number of board members. 
Based on the literature regarding performance 
indicators, this study uses Tobin’s Q as the proxy 
for corporate performance. Both measures, Tobin’s 
Q and Shareholder’s Return, are commonly used 
simultaneously or separately in extant literatures on 
corporate performance. Tobin’s Q was introduced by 
Brainard and Tobin (1968) and later refined by Tobin 
(1969). According to Tobin (1969), the Q statistic is the 
ratio of the market value of outstanding financial claims 
on the firm to the current replacement cost of the firm’s 
asset. Firms displaying Q greater than unity are judged 
as using scarce resources effectively, while those with 
Q less than unity are judged otherwise (Lewellen & 
Badrinath 1997). The advantage of the Tobin’s Q is it 
captures both market and accounting performance of the 
firm. 
Recognizing the equivocal importance of both the 
decision making process and the decision made, this study 
incorporates both the major corporate financial decisions 
and corporate governance aspects that comprise the 
decision making element. The major corporate financial 
decisions concern the capital structure, investment, 
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free cash flows, and dividend policy. The decision 
making process is captured in board governance, which 
is examined on the basis of board size, CEO duality 
and board independence perspectives. Table 2 lists the 
variables and their operational definitions. 
The impact of these corporate financial and 
governance factors is tested on corporate performance in 
the following regression equation;  
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The model is used to identify the corporate financial 
and governance characteristics of the companies. Thus, 
if the model is reliable, it should be able to differentiate 
the characteristics of good performance from the 
poor performance companies. This is accomplished 
by taking the estimated coefficients of the significant 
regressors to create a forecasting model. The coefficients 
of the forecasting model are then used to predict the 
performance of the companies. If the model satisfies the 
reliability criterion, it is assumed that it is an effective tool 
to predict the corporate performance of the companies 
based upon their corporate financial and governance 
behavior. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
Tables 3 and 4 highlight the descriptive statistics and 
correlation matrix of the variables. Table 3 shows that 
the average Tobin’s Q for the total dataset is 0.97. This 
is lower than the international average of 1.30 (Chua et 
al. 2007). It is also lower than the Q of Malaysian firms, 
which for the period of 1996-2000 is 1.13 (Haniffa & 
Hudaib 2006) and for the period of 1999-2004 is 1.12 
(Chua et al. 2007). In a broader scope, Chua et al. (2007) 
reveal that Tobin’s Q range from the highest value of 2.11 
in Finland to the lowest value of 0.77 in Venezuela. The 
average 0.97 value of Q in this study indicates a slightly 
unfavorable valuation of the Malaysian companies by 
the market compared to their replacement value. 
The analysis reveals that the average growth of 
investment is around 5 percent. A low investment growth 
ratio can be explained by the unfavorable Tobin’s Q. 
An average Q of below 1 indicates a situation where 
the firms are lacking in good investment opportunities 
(Morgado & Pindado 2003). The low investment is not 
likely to be caused by difficulties related to raising debt 
because the average debt ratio is still relatively low at 
23% and rather constant at that level throughout the 
6-year period. This debt level is similar to findings of 
Krishnan and Moyer (1997) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
It is worth mentioning here that more than 80% of the 
listed companies in Malaysia are shariah compliant. 
By the international standard of shariah compliance 
criteria, these companies are obliged to keep the leverage 
level below one third of their asset value (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2007). 
The average free cash flows to total asset ratio 
of 3.07% is another potential reason behind the low 
investment growth and below standard Q. When 
insufficient capital is available for financing investment, 
the costs of capital will become higher as companies 
need to resort to external investors. Consequently, less 
investment opportunities are viable (with positive NPV 
or IRR greater than the high cost of capital). Despite the 
low free cash flows and low investment growth rate, 
companies pay out an average of MYR0.06 (Malaysian 
Ringgit) of dividend per share (DPS). DPS increases 
slightly over the period, having the lowest DPS of 
MYR0.48 in 2002 and the highest DPS of MYR0.075 in 
2007. 
In regards to board characteristics, on average, there 
are three independent directors in the board. The natural 
log of the board size is around 2, which is equivalent 
to 8 directors. That makes the independent directors 
around one third of the board members composition. 
These findings are similar to earlier results by Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) and guidelines in the Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance (2001). In term of duality, 
around 27% of the companies have their CEOs serve 
as chairpersons of the board of directors. The findings 
relating to CEO duality and board size are similar to 
those of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). In their study on 
Malaysian firms, Haniffa and Hudaib report an average 
board size of 7.94 and a presence of role duality in around 
25% of the companies. 
Table 4 reports the correlations among the 
dependent and independent variables. The first important 
finding is that Tobin’s Q is significantly related to most 
of the independent variables except for capital structure 
and independent directors. All of the correlations with 
Tobin’s Q are negative except for dividend per share. 
Investors in developing stock markets are more prone to 
appreciating real benefits rather than growth propensity. 
This conjecture is supported by the negative relationships 
between Tobin’s Q and investment and free cash flow and 
the significantly positive relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and dividend per share. With respect to the relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and free cash flows, Jensen (1986) 
argues that managers are more likely to misuse the free 
cash flows if the amount is ample by investing them in 
negative NPV projects. As expected, board independence, 
duality and size are negatively related to Tobin’s Q. 
However, the relationship is insignificant in the case of 
independent directors. Another important finding from 
Table 4 is that none of the correlation coefficients violate 
the assumption for multi-collinearity (correlation greater 
than 0.80), as suggested Gujarati (1995). 
Table 5 reports the results of the Hausman test, 
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics
Variables
Whole 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev St. Dev
Skew Skew Skew Skew Skew Skew Skew
Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis Kurtosis
n = 2166 n = 361 n = 361 n = 361 n = 361 n = 361 n = 361
TOBINQ  0.9753  1.0096  1.0077  1.0657  0.8765  0.8917  1.0006
 1.1187  1.3433  1.1188  1.1654  0.9213  0.9849  1.1249
 6.7078  6.6734  6.7014  5.3272  5.0859  7.9764  7.5012
 63.9153  57.7063  61.7954  38.6261  36.1907  91.6740  82.1223
INV  0.04994  0.0310  0.0644  0.0601  0.0487  0.0351  0.0604
 0.3127  0.3601  0.3839  0.3235  0.3414  0.2026  0.2180
-0.6100  1.7528 -1.5945 -2.7600  0.0261  1.5476 -2.4951
 43.5121  39.2069  43.9189  33.3287  33.2367  24.8127  22.6377
TDTA  0.2302  0.2207  0.2262  0.2288  0.2369  0.2408  0.2278
 0.2096  0.1966  0.1957  0.1879  0.2235  0.2499  0.1981
 2.3792  0.8608  0.9378  0.6773  3.1288  4.2838  1.4207
 22.7956  3.4266  4.1927  2.8046  29.3439  41.4086  8.0126
FCF  0.0308  0.0379  0.0433  0.0312  0.0238  0.0157  0.0327
 0.1346  0.1152  0.1271  0.1428  0.1799  0.1089  0.1201
-4.2300  1.2319  0.4363 -1.3925 -7.9201 -4.7759 -4.7786
 100.524  35.585  43.7043  41.3964  136.879  52.9177  55.3236
DPS  0.0604  0.0483  0.0507  0.0606  0.0587  0.0690  0.0752
 0.1673  0.1452  0.1435  0.1763  0.1591  0.1783  0.1949
 10.1051  10.5497  12.6908  9.8622  11.6072  8.5805  8.7530
  131.607  139.2304  201.472  120.728  175.768  103.247  96.1273
BIND  3.1163  2.9640  3.1191  3.1191  3.0582  3.1994  3.2382
 0.9939  0.9783  1.0218  1.0774  0.9857  0.9123  0.9625
 0.9120  0.9990  0.9336  1.2835  0.5109  0.8713  0.8384
 5.0632  5.9327  4.9629  6.3847  3.7974  4.3591  4.1126
DUAL  0.2770  0.3324  0.2825  0.2909  0.3158  0.2355  0.2050
 0.4476  0.4717  0.4509  0.4548  0.4655  0.4249  0.4043
 0.9966  0.7115  0.9659  0.9210  0.7926  1.2470  1.4616
 1.9931  1.5063  1.9330  1.8482  1.6282  2.5550  3.1362
BSIZE  2.0101  2.0526  2.0371  2.0416  2.0395  1.9601  1.9298
 0.3079  0.2804  0.2874  0.2732  0.2670  0.3377  0.3683
-0.8600 -0.2261 -0.1770 -0.1608 -0.1369 -1.3374 -1.3043
 5.1474  3.5391  3.4850  3.5739  2.8522  5.4234  4.8931
Notes: BSIZE is reported in natural log of total number of Board members. Skew refers to skewness.
TABLE 4. Correlation matrix
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1=TOBINQ 1
2=INV -0.04* 1
3=TDTA -0.01 -0.05** 1
4=FCF -0.08*** 0.25*** -0.20*** 1
5=DPS 0.38*** -0.03 -0.08*** 0.05** 1
6=BIND -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07*** 0.06*** 1
7=BDUAL -0.08*** 0.02 0.07*** -0.03 -0.07*** -0.10*** 1
8=BSIZE -0.05** 0.04** -0.02 0.11*** 0.06*** -0.15*** 0.48***
Notes: * = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%, *** = Significant at 1%. Column headings in number correspond to row headings. 
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whose null hypothesis indicate that the random effect 
panel model is the efficient choice for this dataset. 
However, the result for the TOBINQ model rejects the null 
hypotheses. Hence, the study utilizes a fixed effect panel 
model for estimation. 
TABLE 5. Hausman test for fixed or random effect
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 37.9070 9 0.0000
TABLE 6. Regression results for general models
Panel A. General Model Panel B. Parsimonious Model
R2 0.898 0.898
Adj R2 0.877 0.877
Std. Error 0.687 0.641
F Value 43.012 43.476
P-Value 0.000 0.000
Variables Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
Intercept 0.8640 (40.7460)*** 0.8100 (58.7012)***
INV 0.0028 (0.2297)
TDTA 0.4451 (15.0185)*** 0.0948 (18.9714)***
FCF 0.0215 (0.4569)
DPS 1.1934 (12.7100)*** 0.1803 (13.042)***
BIND 0.0018 (0.5036)
BDUAL -0.0311 (-4.4944)*** -0.0140 (-4.9778)***
BSIZE -0.0304 (-3.5377)*** -0.0081 (-3.7523)***
Notes: * = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%, *** = Significant at 1%. 
Next, the results of running the fixed effect panel 
regression model on 2166 yearly-firm observations 
are depicted in Panel A of Table 6. Collectively, the 
seven corporate financial and governance variables 
explain nearly 88 percent of the variations in corporate 
performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. The results show 
that all selected corporate financial variables influence 
corporate performance positively. However, only debt 
ratio and dividend per share are significant. The sign 
of capital structure (debt ratio) suggests that firms can 
create value through a capital mix which allows more 
component of debt. This positive impact could be due 
to the low debt ratio currently used by the sample firms 
(23%).  The positive DPS coefficient indicates that more 
disbursement to investors in the form of dividend per share 
would increase corporate performance. Meanwhile, in 
contrast to theoretical prediction, a growth in investment 
does not necessarily lead to value creation. The fact that 
free cash flows are also not a significant predictor of 
performance suggests that investors do not appreciate 
having excess cash in the companies either. Overall, the 
investors’ preference for receiving dividend payment to 
spending the capital on investment is consistent with 
“bird-in-the-hand” theory, which posits that investors 
favor certain cash at present time, rather than uncertain 
gain from growth potential in the future.   
On the three dimensions of board governance, only 
board independence has a positive influence on corporate 
performance as predicted, but the impact is insignificant. 
The impacts of CEO duality and board size are negative 
and highly significant, consistent with prediction. With 
regard to the negative influence of CEO duality, Jensen 
(1986) argues that duality role of the CEO creates 
problem for organizational management. Therefore, 
a negative sign suggests a role separation is expected 
to uplift corporate performance. Board size (BSIZE) is 
another negative determinant of corporate performance, 
most probably because a greater number of directors 
tend to create more conflicts in decision making process. 
The rule is probably more about the quality, rather than 
quantity, of the directors. 
By dropping all insignificant variables in Panel A, 
we constructed and ran a parsimonious model on the 
2,166 yearly-firm observations. The results, which are 
reported in Panel B of Table 6, demonstrate that, overall, 
this simplified model yields a goodness-of-fit level which 
is completely compatible with the general model. The 
model generates a corporate performance forecasting 
model as follows;
titititititi BSIZEBDUADPSTDTATOBINQE ,,,,,, )(008.0)(014.0)(183.0)(095.08100.0)( −−+++= α
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The equation is then used to estimate the expected 
Tobin’s Q and rank the performance of the 361 sample 
firms on a yearly basis. Note that the equation has a 
unique intercept for each of the individual firm following 
the convention of the fixed effect regression model. A 
firm is categorized as in the top 10 percent performers if 
it ranks in the list (of 36 highest E(TOBINQ)) for at least 3 
of the six years. Similarly, a firm is categorized as in the 
top 10 percent losers if it remains in the list (of lowest 
36 E(TOBINQ)) for at least 3 of the six years. Once the 
top and worst performance companies are identified, 
the corporate financial performance, including the 
Tobin’s Q and governance characteristics of the firms, 
are determined. As a result, 36 companies have been 
identified as the high performance companies, while 
only 29 companies fit in the category of low performance 
companies. In a sense, the model works more effectively 
in predicting good (100%) performance, rather than poor 
performance (81%). 
TABLE 7. Profile of top versus worst performing companies
TOBINQ TDTA DPS BDUAL lnBSIZE BSIZE
Panel A. Top 10% performing companies
Average 2.694 0.184 0.211 0.185 2.001 7.820
Maximum 15.306 2.916 2.72 1.000 2.639 14.000
Minimum 0.514 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.700 2.012
Panel B. Bottom 10% non-performing companies
Average 0.407 0.146 0.038 0.305 1.995 7.702
Maximum 3.493 1.007 1.256 1.000 2.996 20.000
Minimum 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.954 2.597
Note: Only major factors found significant are compared.
Next, a comparison is made to determine if the high 
performance companies have characteristics that are 
different from those of the low performance companies. 
The resulting financial and governance characteristics are 
shown in Table 7. To begin with, the high performance 
companies report an average actual Tobin’s Q of 2.694, 
which is much higher than that of low performance 
companies (Q = 0.407). Other than performance, this 
result could also be interpreted as indicating that the high 
performance firms are generally those with high quality 
investment opportunities, while the low performance 
companies generally have low quality investment 
opportunities. Dividend per share (DPS) appears to be the 
most prevalent characteristics of the high performance 
companies. This group pays a handsome income of 
21 cent per share to its shareholders, whereas the low 
performance companies pay only 4 cent per share. A 
closer look at the companies reveals that only 11.1 
percent of the 36 high performance companies have not 
been paying dividends throughout the 2002-2007 period. 
Meanwhile, 27.6 percent of the 29 low performance 
companies adopt the zero dividend payments. This clear 
distinction could immediately translate into an investing 
strategy that requires investors to focus on high paying 
dividend stocks for a greater chance of future price 
appreciation.  
Capital structure or debt ratio is only slightly higher 
for the high performance companies (18.4%) compared 
to the low performance (14.6%) companies. While the 
difference is not as clear as in the case of dividends, the 
percentages are also lower than the overall average debt 
ratio (23%). The lower than average debt ratio for the 
high performance companies might suggest that these 
companies can rely on internally generated capital (FCF = 
5.34%) for investment, whose growth is at 2 percent (not 
reported). On the other hand, the much lower debt ratio 
among low performance companies could be attributed 
to the difficulties in securing debt when the firms are in 
poor condition, despite the greater needs for financing 
higher (4.57%) investment growth. The free cash flows 
of the low performance companies are only 0.22 percent. 
In the meantime, the fact that the maximum debt 
ratio for the high performance companies is 292 percent 
suggests two disturbing interpretations. First, it suggests 
that even high performance companies can slip into 
financial distress some times. In this instance, it occurred 
in the case of a large industrial product company, recording 
a debt ratio of more than 200 percent in 2005 and 2006. 
In other years, the company’s debt ratio is as high as 53 
percent and as low as 0.1 percent (obviously after the 
company undergoes a restructuring plan). For investors, 
this implies that temporary down turns in good companies 
should be expected and, therefore, not to be taken as a 
permanent treat to their wealth. Second, the extremely 
high debt ratio also seems to have some weight on the 
average value that, if taken out, leaves an average which 
is very close to that of the low performance companies. 
For example, if the extremely high ratios are replaced 
with the firm’s normal debt ratio (44.4%), the average 
debt ratio for the general performance of companies goes 
down to 16.35 percent. Consequently, it would become 
harder to distinguish the good performance of companies 
from the bad performance of companies based on their 
capital mix.
With regard to the board governance characteristics 
of the firms, it is helpful to first recall that both CEO 
duality and board size negatively influence performance. 
Accordingly, high performance companies are expected 
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to have a lower average than low performance companies. 
The result shows that other than dividends, CEO duality 
also differentiates high performance companies from low 
performance companies. Specifically, high performance 
companies are less likely to hire and rely on the same 
person to hold the two most important roles in the 
company. Only 19 percent of the top firms allow role 
duality, while nearly one third of the poor firms adopt such 
practices. Board size, however, is less definitive than role 
duality in differentiating high performance companies 
from low performance companies. One possible reason 
could be that Malaysian firms are generally adopting the 
right size of board, i.e. 8 persons which is the median 
number of directors for both groups.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Malaysia is an emerging economy that has witnessed 
new companies being listed on Bursa Malaysia at 
an increasing rate each year. The performance of 
these companies is consistently under scrutiny from 
investors, policy makers, and other stakeholders. From 
the researchers’ perspective, corporate performance 
presents a challenging quest for the identification of 
the key determinant factors. This study is particularly 
interested in the influence of financial and governance 
variables, reflecting the importance of the major 
decisions and decision making processes in influencing 
the performance of a firm. Specifically, this study 
investigates the relationship between corporate financial 
and governance decisions on the performance of 361 
listed companies in Malaysia. This study covers a 6-year 
period that spans from 2002 to 2007, which represents 
an economy that is relatively free from major financial 
or economic shocks. 
The fixed effect panel regressions, which are 
conducted on 2,166 yearly-firm balance panel data, 
reveal that dividend per share, CEO duality, debt ratio and 
board size significantly influence corporate performance. 
The impact of financial variables (dividend per share and 
debt ratio) on corporate performance is positive, whereas 
that of board governance (CEO duality and Board size) 
is negative. Of the two financial variables, dividend 
per share appears to contribute more positively to firm 
performance. Since this condition occurs during a period 
when investment is low, it may be surmised that investors 
appreciate sure cash rather than expected future price 
appreciation. The slow investment growth (5%) is not 
likely due to financing constraint because debt ratio is still 
low and remains relatively constant at 23% throughout 
the study period. This suggests that companies do not 
attempt to increase debt to finance their investment. 
Rather, with the low Q values, the slow investment 
growth is more likely to reflect a safe strategy, whereby 
firms become very selective in choosing projects that are 
vital to the performance of the company. This evidence is 
also consistent with the “bird-in-the-hand” theory.     
The results from the parsimonious model, which 
incorporates only the four significant determinants, 
indicate that the model is more effective in predicting 
good performance, rather than poor performance. 
Comparisons between the two groups yield results, 
demonstrating that high performance companies pay 
a much higher dividend per share and are less likely 
to allow their CEOs to also serve as the chairpersons 
of the board of directors. It is, however, more difficult 
to differentiate the two groups based on the level of 
debt ratio and board size. The low indifferent debt 
ratio (without the extreme values) is lower than the 
average debt ratio for the overall companies. For the 
high performance companies, it may suggest that these 
companies can rely on their internally generated capital 
(FCF = 5.34%) for financing investment, whose growth is 
2 percent. For the low performance companies, it could 
be interpreted as their failure to secure debt due to the 
poor financial condition (FCF = 0.22%), despite their 
greater needs for financing higher (4.57%) investment 
growth. Board size also plays a less definitive role in 
differentiating the good performance companies from 
the poor performance companies. One possible reason 
could be that Malaysian firms are generally adopting the 
right size of board, i.e. 8 persons, which is the median 
number of directors for both groups. In a nutshell the 
results imply that Malaysian firms behave in such a way 
that pleases investors, who place certainty of return at the 
top of their priority list. While future growth propensity is 
uncertain, limiting tied-up capital on investment is more 
likely to also receive positive market reaction unless if 
investment can be funded by internally generated funds 
without having to rely on more costly borrowings. 
Future studies should re-examine this issue in 
periods that include uncertainty. Extending the study 
period backward and forward will incorporate the 
turbulent periods of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and 
the 2008 global sub-prime crisis. However, these periods 
will pose a challenge for a study that employs panel 
data because more companies are likely to fail or delist 
during difficult economic conditions. It is also important 
to note that the intercept of the general and parsimonious 
models consistently show highly significant values. 
This indicates that other factors need to be taken into 
consideration when predicting the financial performance 
of firms.
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